Free Will: A Naturalistic Reformulation

Eric Sanchis

Abstract


In the classical approach to free will, this property is typically studied in relation to both moral responsibility and ontological determinism. The debates at the core of this approach concern the compatibility between the existence of free will and the existence of ontological determinism. The approach proposed here examines free will as an autonomous property—that is, independently of moral responsibility—and highlights the inconsistency of the definition of ontological determinism within the scientifically known physical world. Free will is naturalised in the form of a specific decision-making process, called the PSU model. This process is implemented by an agent in order to overcome potential conditioning when facing a decision in a previously experienced situation.

Keywords


free will, ontological determinism, scientifically known physical world, conditioning, decision-making process

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.52155/ijpsat.v57.1.8029

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